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In contrast to the common assumption that mathematics cognition involves the attempt to 
recognize a previously unnoticed meaning of a concept, here mathematics cognition is 
reconsidered as a process of ascribing meaning to the objects of one’s thinking. In this paper, 
the attention is focused on three processes that are convoluted in the complex dynamics involved 
when individuals ascribe meaning to higher mathematical objects: contextualizing, 
complementizing, and complexifying. The aim is to discuss emerging perspectives of these three 
processes in more detail that speak to the complex dynamics in mathematics cognition. 
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Introduction 
Mathematics cognition is a complex phenomenon that has been addressed and discussed in 
the literature in different ways and with various emphases. The work presented here arose from a 
primary cognitive tradition, focusing on critical processes in mathematical concept formation and 
their complex dynamics. In search for more dialogical possibilities in thinking about 
mathematics cognition, a new understanding of mathematics cognition emerged (see Scheiner & 
Pinto, 2017): mathematics cognition does not merely involve the attempt to recognize a 
previously unnoticed meaning of a concept but the attempt to ascribe meaning to the objects of 
one’s thinking. The purpose of this paper is to provide deeper meaning to the complex processes 
involved when individuals ascribe meaning. In this paper, three processes are foregrounded: 
contextualizing, complementizing, and complexifying. Over the past few years, theoretical 
perspectives and insights emerged (in reanalyzing students’ knowing and learning of the limit 
concept of a sequence) that advance our understanding of these processes. These new 
perspectives and insights inform research on mathematics cognition and enable one to see not 
only new phenomena in mathematical concept formation but to think about them differently. In 
this presentation, emerging interpretative possibilities in thinking about contextualizing, 
complementizing, and complexifying are discussed that speak to the complex dynamics in 
mathematics cognition. 
Theoretical Orientations 
The work presented here relies on and projects theoretical assertions made by Frege (1892a, 
1892b). First, the meaning of a mathematical concept is not directly accessible through the 
concept itself but only through objects that fall under the concept (Frege, 1892a). Second, 
mathematical objects (different to objects of natural sciences) cannot be apprehended by human 
senses (we cannot, for instance, ‘see’ the objects), but only via some ‘mode of presentation.’ 
That we only have access to mathematical objects in using signs and representations, however, 
leads to what Duval (2006) called a ‘cognitive paradox’:  
“how can they [individuals] distinguish the represented object from the semiotic 
representation used if they cannot get access to the mathematical object apart from the 
semiotic representation?” (Duval, 2006, p. 107) 
It seems to be an epistemological requirement to distinguish the ‘mode of presentation’ (or 
‘way of presentation’) of an object from the object that is represented. Frege (1892b) revealed 
this critical insight, by proposing that an expression has a senseF (‘Sinn’) in addition to its 
referenceF (‘Bedeutung’) (the subscript F indicates that these terms refer to Frege, 1892b). The 
referenceF of an expression is the object it refers to, whereas the senseF describes a particular 
state of affairs in the world, the way that some object is presented. Thus, it seems to follow that 
we may understand Frege’s notion of an ideaF the manner in which we make sense of the world. 
IdeasF can interact with each other and form more compressed knowledge structures, called 
conceptions. A general outline of this view is provided in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: On referenceF, senseF, ideaF, and compression (reproduced from Scheiner, 2016, p. 179) 
Duval (2006) argued that via systematic variation of representation registers that is, 
“investigating representation variations in the source register and representation variations in a 
target register” (p. 125), one can detach a senseF from the represented object. This resonates a 
critical function of reflective abstraction that is, reflecting on the coordination of actions on 
mental objects (see Piaget, 1977/2001). The special function of reflective abstraction is 
extracting meaning of an individual’s action coordination. Underlying these approaches is the 
assumption that meaning is inherent in objects and is to be extracted via manipulating objects (or 
representations of those objects).   
Over the past few years, a new understanding of mathematics cognition emerged from 
reanalyzing students’ knowing and learning the limit concept of a sequence (see Scheiner & 
Pinto, 2014, 2017; Pinto & Scheiner, 2016): mathematics cognition does not so much involve the 
attempt to recognize a previously unnoticed meaning of a concept (or the structure common to 
various objects), but rather a process of ascribing meaning to the objects of an individual’s 
thinking. That is, meaning is not so much an inherent quality of objects that is to be extracted, 
but something that is given to objects of one’s thinking. Three processes are considered as 
critical in the complex dynamics involved when individuals ascribe meaning to higher 
mathematical objects: contextualizing, complementizing, and complexifying (see Scheiner & 
Pinto, 2017).   
Contextualizing: Particularizing SensesF 
In Frege’s view, a senseF can be construed as a certain state of affairs in the world and an 
ideaF in which we make senseF of the world. In the work presented here, we started from an 
understanding of senseF as not primarily dependent on a mathematical object, but as emerging 
from the interaction of an individual with an object in the immediate context. That is, a senseF of 
an object at one moment in time can only be established in a more or less definite way when the 
process of senseF-making is supported by what van Oers (1998) called contextualizing. Van Oers 
(1998) argued for a dynamic approach to context that provides for the “particularization of 
meaning” (p. 475), or more precisely, the particularization of a senseF that comes into being in a 
context in which an object actualizes. 
Recent research suggests that individuals seem to reason and make sense from a specific 
perspective (see Scheiner & Pinto, 2017). It might be suggested that individuals take a specific 
perspective that orients their senseF-making, or more accurately: in taking a certain perspective, 
individuals direct their attention to particular sensesF. Contextualizing, in this view, means taking 
a certain perspective that calls attention to particular sensesF. Attention in such cases, however, 
may not involve an attempt to ‘sense’ or ‘see’ anything, but it seems to be attentive thinking: 
attention as the direction of thinking (see Mole, 2011). As such, calling attention to particular 
sensesF, then, means directing mind to senseF. In this respect, contextualizing is intentional: it 
directs one’s thinking to particular sensesF.   
Complementizing: Creating Conceptual Unity 
Frege (1892b) underlined that a particular senseF “illuminates the referenceF […] in a very 
one-sided fashion. A complete knowledge of the referenceF would require that we could say 
immediately whether any given senseF belongs to the referenceF. To such knowledge we never 
attain” (p. 27). (Translated from Frege (1892b): “[mit dem Sinn] ist die Bedeutung aber […] 
immer nur einseitig beleuchtet. Zu einer allseitigen Erkenntniss der Bedeutung würde gehören, 
dass wir von jedem gegebenen Sinne sogleich angeben könnten, ob er zu ihr gehöre. Dahin 
gelangen wir nie”). This is to say, that just from senseF-making of one representation that refers 
to an object, we are typically not in a position to know what the object is (see Duval, 2006). As 
contextualizing serves to particularize only single sensesF of a represented object, the same 
object can be ‘re-contextualized’ (see van Oers, 1998) in other ways that support the 
particularization of different sensesF of the same object. Notice that sensesF can differ despite 
sameness of referenceF, and it is this difference of sensesF that accounts for the ‘epistemological 
value’ of different representations. It is the diversity of sensesF that has ‘epistemological 
significance’ and forms conceptual unity (see structuralist approach, Scheiner, 2016), not the 
similarity (or sameness) of sensesF (as might be advocated in an empiricist approach). This 
means, what matters is to coordinate diverse sensesF to form a unity, a process called 
complementizing. However, the notion of ‘complementizing’ might be misunderstood as 
accumulating various sensesF (until an individual has all of them); this is not the case. 
Complementizing means to coordinate different sensesF to create conceptual unity.  
As each ideaF is partial in the sense of being restricted (in space and time) and biased (from a 
particular perspective), it needs to be put in dialogue with other ideasF that offers an 
epistemological extension. The function of complementizing, then, is extending the 
epistemological space of possible ideasF. Complementizing as extending the epistemological 
space of possible ideasF brings a positive stance, indicating that seemingly conflicting ideasF can 
be productively coordinated in a way such that these ideasF are cooperative rather than 
conflicting. Hence complementizing is the ongoing expansion of one’s epistemological space, 
the ever-unfolding process of becoming capable of new, perhaps as-yet unimaginable 
possibilities.  
Complexifying: Creating a Complex Knowledge System 
It is not only creating a unity of diverse sensesF, but creating an entity in its own right that 
forms a ‘whole’ from which emerges new qualities of the entity. That is, rather than treating the 
unity as a collection of different sensesF that can be assigned to objects that actualize in the 
immediate context, it is the forming of the unity that emerges new sensesF that might be assigned 
to potential objects. In forming a unity, sensesF are not merely considered as the parts of the 
unity, but “they are viewed as forming a whole with distinct properties and relations” (Dörfler, 
2002, p. 342). It is, therefore, not an unachievable totality of sensesF (or ideasF) that matters, but 
how sensesF (or ideasF) are coordinated that develop emergent structure. This brings to 
foreground a critical function of complexifying that has not been attested yet: blending 
previously unrelated ideasF that emerge new dynamics and structure (for a detailed account of 
conceptual blending, see Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). The essence of conceptual blending is to 
construct a partial match, called a cross-space mapping, between frames from established 
domains (known as inputs), in order to project selectively from those inputs into a novel hybrid 
frame (a blend), comprised of a structure from each of its inputs, as well as a unique structure of 
its own (emergent structure). This strengthens Tall’s (2013) assertion that the “whole 
development of mathematical thinking is presented as a combination of compression and 
blending of knowledge structures to produce crystalline concepts that can lead to imaginative 
new ways of thinking mathematically in new contexts” (p. 28). 
Discussion 
Mathematics cognition, as asserted here, evolves in the dialogue of contextualizing, 
complementizing, and complexifying. As such, mathematics cognition is ongoing and cannot be 
pre-stated. That is, mathematics cognition does not follow a determinable developmental 
trajectory, but the evolution of mathematics cognition is directional: it seems to move toward 
higher levels of internal diversity, interactions, and decentralization of ideasF.  
Scheiner and Pinto (2017) suggested that individuals take a specific perspective in ascribing 
meaning to the limit concept of a sequence. For instance, individuals, who take the perspective of 
a limit sequence as approaching, may activate dynamic ideasF (such as the ideaF of a sequence of 
points ‘getting closer’ to a limit point). Consider Figure 2: one might activate the ideaF of a limit 
that can be approached monotonically (see ideaF A) or the ideaF of a limit that can be approached 
from above and below (see ideaF B) in making senseF of the respective representation (see Cornu, 
1991; Davis & Vinner, 1986; Tall & Vinner, 1981). On the other hand, individuals, who take the 
perspective of closeness in thinking about the limit concept of a sequence, might activate rather 
static ideasF (such as the ideaF of points of a sequence ‘gathering around’ the limit point). One 
might activate the ideaF that infinite many points of a sequence can lie within a given epsilon 
strip (see ideaF U or V) in making senseF of the representations (see Przenioslo, 2004; Roh, 
2008; Williams, 1991).  
 
 
Figure 2: On the complex dynamics in mathematics cognition  
The critical point here is that it is not one single ideaF around one’s thinking is to be 
organized (such as the ideaF that only finite many points lie outside a given epsilon strip), but a 
variety of diverse ideasF that provides a resource of activating productive ideasF and of making 
senseF in the immediate context. Decentralization and internal diversity of ideasF, however, are 
not only critical for making senseF in the immediate context, but also for creating novel ideasF. 
Whereas analogy theory typically focuses on compatibilities between ideasF simultaneously 
connected, blending is equally driven by incompatibilities (see Fauconnier & Turner, 2002).    
Creating novel ideasF, however, only occurs if there is a certain level of interaction between 
existing ideasF. That is, only if ideasF can compensate for each other’s restrictions and 
limitations, one is able to extend the space of possibilities in thinking about a mathematical 
concept. In this view, novel ideasF can ascribe new meaning to the objects of one’s thinking (see 
Figure 2). This substantiates the assertion that mathematics cognition is as much concerned with 
creating a meaning of a concept as it is with comprehending it (see Scheiner, 2017).  
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